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Abstract
Dependence logic, introduced in [8], cannot be axiomatized. However,
first-order consequences of dependence logic sentences can be axiomatized,
and this is what we shall do in this paper. We give an explicit axiomatization
and prove the respective Completeness Theorem.
1 Introduction
Dependence logic was introduced in [8]. It extends ordinary first order logic by
new atomic formulas =(x1, ..., xn, y) with the intuitive meaning that the values of
the variables x1, ..., xn completely determine the value of y is. This means that
the relevant semantic game is a game of imperfect information. A player who
picks y and claims that her strategy is a winning strategy should make the choice
so that if the strategy is played twice, with the same values for x1, ..., xn, then
the value of y is the same as well. Dependence logic cannot be axiomatized, for
the set of its valid formulas is of the same complexity as that of full second order
logic. However, the first order consequences of dependence logic sentences can
be axiomatized. In this paper we give such an axiomatization.
Let us quickly review the reason why dependence logic cannot be effectively
axiomatized. Consider the sentence
θ1 : ∃z∀x∃y(=(y, x) ∧ ¬y = z).
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We give the necessary preliminaries about dependence logic in the next section,
but let us for now accept that θ1 is true in a model if and only if the domain
of the model is infinite. The player who picks y has to pick a different y for
different x. Although dependence logic does not have a negation in the sense
of classical logic, the mere existence of θ1 in dependence logic should give a
hint that axiomatization is going to be a problem. Elaborating but a little, θ1 can
be turned into a sentence θ2 in the language of arithmetic which says that some
elementary axioms of number theory fail or else some number has infinitely many
predecessors. We can now prove that a first-order sentence φ of the language of
arithmetic is true in (N,+,×, <) if and only if θ2 ∨ φ is logically valid (true in
every model) in dependence logic. This can be seen as follows: Suppose first
φ is true in (N,+,×, <). Let us take an arbitrary model M of the language of
arithmetic. If M |= θ2, we may conclude M |= Θ2 ∨ φ. So let us assume
M 6|= θ2. Thus M satisfies the chosen elementary axioms of number theory and
every element has only finitely many predecessors. As a consequence, M ∼=
(N,+,×, <), so M |= φ, and again M |= θ2∨φ. For the converse, suppose θ2∨φ
is logically valid. Since (N,+,×, <) fails to satisfy θ2, we must conclude that φ
is true in (N,+,×, <).
The above inference demonstrates that truth in (N,+,×, <) can be reduced to
logical validity in dependence logic. Thus, by Tarski’s Undefinability of Truth ar-
gument, logical validity in dependence logic is non-arithmetical, and there cannot
be any (effective) complete axiomatization of dependence logic.
The negative result just discussed would seem to frustrate any attempt to ax-
iomatize dependence logic. However, there are at least two possible remedies.
The first is to modify the semantics - this in the line adopted in Henkin’s Com-
pleteness Theorem for second-order logic. For dependence logic this direction is
taken in Galliani [4]. The other remedy is to restrict to a fragment of dependence
logic. This is the line of attack of this paper. We restrict to logical consequences
T |= φ, in which T is in dependence logic but φ is in first-order logic.
The advantage of restricting to T |= φ, with first-order φ, is that we can reduce
the Completeness Theorem, assuming that T ∪ {¬φ} is deductively consistent,
to the problem of constructing a model for T ∪ {¬φ}. Since dependence logic
can be translated to existential second-order logic, the construction of a model
for T ∪ {¬φ} can in principle be done in first-order logic, by translating T to
first-order by using new predicate symbols. This observation already shows that
T |= φ, for first-order φ, can in principle be axiomatized. Our goal in this paper
is to give an explicit axiomatization.
The importance of an explicit axiomatization over and above the mere knowl-
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edge that an axiomatization exists, is paramount. The axioms and rules that we
introduce throw light in a concrete way on logically sound inferences concerning
dependence concepts. It turns out, perhaps unexpectedly, that fairly simple albeit
non-trivial axioms and rules suffice.
Our axioms and rules are based on Barwise [1], where approximations of
Henkin sentences, sentences which start with a partially ordered quantifier, are
introduced. The useful method introduced by Barwise builds on earlier work on
game expressions by Svenonius [7] and Vaught [9].
By axiomatizing first order consequences we get an axiomatization of incon-
sistent dependence logic theories as a bonus, contradiction being itself expressible
in first order logic. The possibility of axiomatizing inconsistency in IF logic—a
relative of dependence logic—has been emphasized by Hintikka [6].
The structure of the paper is the following. After the preliminaries we present
our system of natural deduction in Section 3. In Section 4 we give a rather detailed
proof of the Soundness of our system, which is not a priori obvious. Section 5 is
devoted to the proof, using game expressions and their approximations, of the
Completeness Theorem. The final section gives examples and open problems.
The second author is indebted to John Burgess for suggesting the possible rel-
evance for dependence logic of the work of Barwise on approximations of Henkin
formulas.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we define Dependence Logic (D) and recall some basic results
about it.
Definition 1 ([8]). The syntax of D extends the syntax of FO, defined in terms of
∨, ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀, by new atomic formulas (dependence atoms) of the form
=(t1, . . . , tn), (1)
where t1, . . . , tn are terms. For a vocabulary τ ,D[τ ] denotes the set of τ -formulas
of D.
The intuitive meaning of the dependence atom (1) is that the value of the term
tn is functionally determined by the values of the terms t1, . . . , tn−1. As singular
cases we have =() which we take to be universally true, and =(t) meaning that
the value of t is constant.
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The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ ∈ D is defined as for first-order
logic, except that we have the new case
Fr(=(t1, . . . , tn)) = Var(t1) ∪ · · · ∪Var(tn),
where Var(ti) is the set of variables occurring in the term ti. If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call
φ a sentence.
In order to define the semantics of D, we first need to define the concept of a
team. Let A be a model with domain A. Assignments of A are finite mappings
from variables into A. The value of a term t in an assignment s is denoted by
tA〈s〉. If s is an assignment, x a variable, and a ∈ A, then s(a/x) denotes the
assignment (with domain Dom(s) ∪ {x}) which agrees with s everywhere except
that it maps x to a.
Let A be a set and {x1, . . . , xk} a finite (possibly empty) set of variables. A
team X of A with domain Dom(X) = {x1, . . . , xk} is any set of assignments
from the variables {x1, . . . , xk} into the set A. We denote by rel(X) the k-ary
relation of A corresponding to X
rel(X) = {(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) : s ∈ X}.
If X is a team of A, and F : X → A, we use X(F/xn) to denote the (sup-
plemented) team {s(F (s)/xn) : s ∈ X} and X(A/xn) the (duplicated) team
{s(a/xn) : s ∈ X and a ∈ A}. It is convenient to adopt a shorthand notation for
teams arising from successive applications of the supplementation and duplication
operations, e.g., we abbreviate X(F1/x1)(A/x2)(F3/y1) as X(F1AF3/x1x2y1).
Our treatment of negation is the following: We call a formula of D first-order
if it does not contain any dependence atoms. We assume that the scope of nega-
tion is always a first order formula. We could allow negation everywhere, but
since negation in dependence logic is treated as dual, it would only result in the
introduction of a couple of more rules of the de Morgan type in the definition of
semantics, as well as in the definition of the deductive system.
We are now ready to define the semantics of dependence logic. In this defini-
tion A |=s φ refers to satisfaction in first-order logic.
Definition 2 ([8]). Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation
A |=X ϕ is defined as follows:
1. If φ is first-order, then A |=X φ iff for all s ∈ X , A |=s φ.
2. A |=X=(t1, . . . , tn) iff for all s, s′ ∈ X such that
tA1 〈s〉 = t
A
1 〈s
′〉, . . . , tAn−1〈s〉 = t
A
n−1〈s
′〉, we have tAn〈s〉 = tAn〈s′〉.
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3. A |=X ψ ∧ φ iff A |=X ψ and A |=X φ.
4. A |=X ψ ∨ φ iff X = Y ∪ Z such that A |=Y ψ and A |=Z φ .
5. A |=X ∃xnψ iff A |=X(F/xn) ψ for some F : X → A.
6. A |=X ∀xnψ iff A |=X(A/xn) ψ.
Above, we assume that the domain of X contains the variables free in φ. Finally,
a sentence φ is true in a model A, A |= φ, if A |={∅} φ.
The truth definition of dependence logic can be also formulated in game the-
oretic terms [8]. In terms of semantic games, the truth of =(x1, . . . , xn, y) means
that the player who claims a winning strategy has to demonstrate certain unifor-
mity. This means that if the game is played twice, the player, say ∃, reaching both
times the same subformula =(x1, . . . , xn, y), then if the values of x1, . . . , xn were
the same in both plays, the value of y has to be the same, too.
Next we define the notions of logical consequence and equivalence for formu-
las of dependence logic.
Definition 3. Let T be a set of formulas of dependence logic with only finitely
many free variables. The formula ψ is a logical consequence of T ,
T |= ψ,
if for all models A and teams X , with Fr(ψ) ∪ ⋃φ∈T Fr(φ) ⊆ Dom(X), and
A |=X T we have A |=X ψ. The formulas φ and ψ are logically equivalent,
φ ≡ ψ,
if φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ.
The following basic properties of dependence logic will be extensively used
in this article.
Let X be a team with domain {x1, . . . , xk} and V ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}. Denote by
X ↾ V the team {s ↾ V : s ∈ X} with domain V . The following lemma shows
that the truth of a formula depends only on the interpretations of the variables
occurring free in the formula.
Proposition 4. Suppose V ⊇ Fr(φ). Then A |=X φ if and only if A |=X↾V φ.
The following fact is also a very basic property of all formulas of dependence
logic:
Proposition 5 (Downward closure). Let φ be a formula of dependence logic, A a
model, and Y ⊆ X teams. Then A |=X φ implies A |=Y φ.
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3 A system of natural deduction
We will next present inference rules that allow us to derive all first-order conse-
quences of sentences of dependence logic.
Here is the first set of rules that we will use. The substitution of a term t to
the free occurrences of x in ψ(x) is denoted by ψ(t/x). Analogously to first-order
logic, no variable of t can become bound in such substitution.
We use an abbreviation ~x = ~y for the formula
∧
1≤i≤len(~x) xi = yi, assuming
of course that ~x and ~y are tuples of the same length len(~x). Furthermore, for an
assignment s, and a tuple of variables ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), we sometimes denote the
tuple (s(x1), . . . , s(xn)) by s(~x).
In addition to the rules of Figure 1, we also adopt the following rules:
Definition 6. 1. Disjunction substitution:
A ∨ B
[B]
.
.
.
.
C
A ∨ C
2. Commutation and associativity of disjunction:
B ∨A
A ∨B
(A ∨B) ∨ C
A ∨ (B ∨ C)
3. Extending scope:
∀xA ∨B
∀x(A ∨B)
where the prerequisite for applying this rule is that x does not appear free
in B.
4. Extending scope:
∃xA ∨B
∃x(A ∨B)
where the prerequisite for applying this rule is that x does not appear free
in B.
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Operation Introduction Elimination
Conjunction
A B
A ∧B
∧ I
A ∧B
A
∧ E
A ∧B
B
∧ E
Disjunction
A
A ∨ B
∨ I
B
A ∨B
∨ I
A ∨B
[A]
.
.
.
.
C
[B]
.
.
.
.
C
C
∨ E
Condition 1.
Negation
[A]
.
.
.
.
B ∧ ¬B
¬A
¬ I
¬¬A
A
¬ E
Condition 2. Condition 2.
Universal quantifier
A
∀xiA
∀ I
∀xiA
A(t/xi)
∀ E
Condition 3.
Existential quantifier
A(t/xi)
∃xiA
∃ I
∃xiA
[A]
.
.
.
.
B
B
∃ E
Condition 4.
Condition 1. C is first-order.
Condition 2. The formulas are first-order.
Condition 3. The variable xi cannot appear free in any non-discharged assumption
used in the derivation of A.
Condition 4. The variable xi cannot appear free in B and in any non-discharged
assumption used in the derivation of B, except in A.
Figure 1: The first set of rules.
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5. Unnesting:
=(t1, ..., tn)
∃z(=(t1, ..., z, ..., tn) ∧ z = ti)
where z is a new variable.
6. Dependence distribution: let
A = ∃y1 . . .∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~zj , yj) ∧ C),
B = ∃yn+1 . . .∃yn+m(
∧
n+1≤j≤n+m
=(~zj , yj) ∧D).
where C andD are quantifier-free formulas without dependence atoms, and
yi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not appear in B and yi, for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n +m,
does not appear in A. Then,
A ∨ B
∃y1 . . .∃yn+m(
∧
1≤j≤n+m =(~z
j , yj) ∧ (C ∨D))
Note that the logical form of this rule is:
∃~y(
∧
1≤j≤n =(~z
j , yj) ∧ C) ∨ ∃~y′(
∧
n+1≤j≤n+m =(~z
j , yj) ∧D)
∃~y∃~y′(
∧
1≤j≤n+m =(~z
j , yj) ∧ (C ∨D))
7. Dependence introduction:
∃x∀yA
∀y∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ A)
where ~z lists the variables in Fr(A)− {x, y}.
8. Dependence elimination:
∀ ~x0∃~y0(
∧
1≤j≤k =(~w
ij , y0,ij) ∧ B( ~x0, ~y0)),
∀ ~x0∃~y0(B( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(B( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)))
where ~xl = (xl,1, . . . , xl,m) and ~yl = (yl,1, . . . , yl,n) for l ∈ {0, 1} (~wp0 and
~wp1 are related analogously), and the variables in ~wij are contained in the
set
{x0,1, . . . , x0,m, y0,1, . . . , y0,ij−1}.
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Furthermore, the set S contains the conjuncts of
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij),
and the dependence atom =(x0,1, . . . , x0,m, y0,p) for each of the variables
y0,p (1 ≤ p ≤ n) such that y0,p /∈ {y0,i1, . . . , y0,ik}.
9. The usual identity axioms.
It is worth noting that the elimination rule for disjunction is not correct in the
context of dependence logic. Therefore we have to assume the rules 1-4 regarding
disjunction, which are easily derivable in first-order logic. Note also that the ana-
logues of the rules 1-4 for conjunction need not be assumed since they are easily
derivable from the other rules.
Note that we do not assume the so called Armstrong’s Axioms for dependence
atoms. If we assumed them, we might be able to simplify the dependence elimi-
nation and the dependence distribution rules, but we have not pursued this line of
thinking.
4 The Soundness Theorem
In this section we show that the inference rules defined in the previous section are
sound for dependence logic.
Proposition 7. Let T ∪ {ψ} be a set of formulas of dependence logic. If T ⊢D ψ,
then T |= ψ.
Proof. We will prove the claim using induction on the length of derivation. The
soundness of the rules ¬ E, and 2-6 follows from the corresponding logical equiv-
alences proved in [8] and [3] (rules 5-6). Furthermore, the soundness of the rules
∧ E, ∧ I, ∨ I, and rule 1 is obvious. We consider the remaining rules below. The
following lemma is needed in the proof.
Lemma 8. Let φ(x) be a formula, and t a term such that in the substitution φ(t/x)
no variable of t becomes bound. Then for all A and teams X , where (Fr(φ) −
{x}) ∪Var(t) ⊆ Dom(X)
A |=X φ(t/x)⇔ A |=X(F/x) φ(x),
where F : X → A is defined by F (s) = tA〈s〉.
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Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3.28 in [8].
∨ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of a first-order formula C
from the assumptions
{A1, . . . , Ak}
with the last rule ∨ E applied to A ∨ B. Let A and X be such that A |=X
Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter deduction of
A ∨ B from the same assumptions, and deductions of C from both of the
sets {A,A1, . . . , Ak} and {B,A1, . . . , Ak}. By the induction assumption,
we get that A |=X A ∨ B, and hence X = Y ∪ Z with A |=Y A and
A |=Z B. Let s ∈ X , e.g. s ∈ Y . We know A |=Y A. Thus by the induction
assumption, we get that A |=Y C, and therefore A |=s C. Analogously, if
s ∈ Z, then since A |=Z B we get A |=Z C, and therefore A |=s C. In
either case A |=s C, hence A |=X C as wanted.
¬ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of a first order formula ¬A
from the assumptions
{A1, . . . , Ak}
with the last rule ¬ I. Let A and X be such that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤
k. By the assumption, we have a shorter deduction of B ∧ ¬B from the
assumptions {A,A1, . . . , Ak}. We claim that now A |=X ¬A, i.e., A |=s
¬A for all s ∈ X . For contradiction, assume that A 6|=s ¬A for some
s ∈ X . Then A |=s A. By Proposition 5, we get that A |={s} Ai, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now, by the induction assumption, we get that A |=s B ∧ ¬B
which is a contradiction.
∃ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of θ from the assumptions
{A1, . . . , Ak} (2)
with last rule ∃ E. Let A and X be such that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
By the assumption, we have shorter proofs of a formula of the form ∃xφ
from the assumptions (2) and of θ from
{φ,Ai1, . . . , Ail},
where {Ai1 , . . . , Ail} ⊆ {A1, . . . , Ak}. Note that the variable x cannot
appear free in θ and in Ai1 , . . . , Ail . By the induction assumption, we get
that A |=X ∃xφ, hence
A |=X(F/x) φ (3)
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for some F : X → A. Since x does not appear free in the formulas Aij ,
Proposition 4 implies that
A |=X(F/x) Aij (4)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. By (3) and (4), and the induction assumption, we get that
A |=X(F/x) θ and, since x does not appear free in θ, it follows again by
Proposition 4 that A |=X θ.
∃ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∃xψ from the assump-
tions
{A1, . . . , Ak}
with last rule ∃ I. Let A and X be such that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the
assumption, we have a shorter proof of ψ(t/x) from the same assumptions.
By the induction assumption, we get that A |=X ψ(t/x). Lemma 8 now
implies that A |=X(F/x) ψ(x), where F (s) = tA〈s〉. Therefore, we get
A |=X ∃xψ.
∀ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ψ(t/x) from the assump-
tions
{A1, . . . , Ak}
with last rule ∀ E. Let A and X be such that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By
the assumption, we have a shorter proof of ∀xψ from the same assumptions.
By the induction assumption, we get that A |=X ∀xψ and hence
A |=X(A/x) ψ(x). (5)
We need to show A |=X ψ(t/x). We can use Lemma 8 to show this: by
Lemma 8, it suffices to show that A |=X(F/x) ψ(x). But now obviously
X(F/x) ⊆ X(A/x), hence A |=X(F/x) ψ(x) follows using (5) and Propo-
sition 5.
∀ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∀xψ from the assump-
tions
{A1, . . . , Ak}
with last rule ∀ I. Let A and X be such that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the
assumption, we have a shorter proof of ψ from the same assumptions. Note
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that the variable x cannot appear free in the Ai’s and hence by Proposition
4
A |=X(A/x) Ai,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the induction assumption, we get that A |=X(A/x) ψ, and
finally that A |=X ∀xψ as wanted.
Rule 7 Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∀y∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ φ) from
the assumptions {A1, . . . , Ak} with last rule 7. Let A and X be such that
A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof
of ∃x∀yφ from the assumptions {A1, . . . , Ak} and thus by the induction
assumption we get
A |=X ∃x∀yφ.
By Proposition 4, it follows that
A |=X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y}) ∃x∀yφ.
Hence there is F : X ↾ (Fr(φ)− {x, y})→ A such that
A |=X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y})(FA/xy) φ.
By the definition F , we have
A |=X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y})(FA/xy)=(~z, x) ∧ φ,
where ~z lists the variables in Fr(φ)− {x, y}. By redefining F as a function
with domain
X ↾ (Fr(φ)− {x, y})(A/y),
it follows that
A |=(X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y}))(A/y) ∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ φ),
and finally that
A |=X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y}) ∀y∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ φ).
By Proposition 4, we may conclude that
A |=X ∀y∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ φ).
In fact, it is straightforward to show that this rule is based on the corre-
sponding logical equivalence:
∃x∀yψ ≡ ∀y∃x(=(~z, x) ∧ φ).
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Rule 8 Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ψ of the form
∀ ~x0∃~y0(B( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(B( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)))
from the assumptions {A1, . . . , Ak} with last rule 8. Let A and X be such
that A |=X Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof
of φ
φ := ∀ ~x0∃~y0(
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij) ∧B( ~x0, ~y0)), (6)
from the same assumptions. By the induction assumption, we get thatA |=X
φ, hence there are functions F0,r, 1 ≤ r ≤ n, such that
A |=X(A···AF0,1···F0,n/ ~x0, ~y0)
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij) ∧ B( ~x0, ~y0). (7)
We can now interpret the variable y1,r essentially by the same function F0,r
that was used to interpret y0,r. Suppose that there is 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
y0,r = y0,ij . For the sake of bookkeeping, we write ~wij as ~w
ij
0 and by ~w
ij
1
we denote the tuple arising from ~wij by replacing x0,s by x1,s and y0,s by
y1,s, respectively. We can now define F1,r such that F1,r(s) := s′(y0,r),
where s′ is any assignment satisfying s′(~wij0 ) = s(~w
ij
1 ) (s and s′ are applied
pointwise). In the case there is no 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that y0,r = y0,ij , we use
the tuple x0,1, . . . , x0,m, instead of ~wij , and proceed analogously.
We first show that
A |=X(A¯F¯0A¯F¯1/ ~x0, ~y0 ~x1, ~y1) B( ~x1, ~y1) (8)
holds. The variables in ~x0 and ~y0 do not appear in B( ~x1, ~y1), thus (8) holds
iff
A |=X(A¯F¯1/ ~x1, ~y1) B( ~x1, ~y1). (9)
Now (9) is equivalent to the truth of the second conjunct in (7), modulo
renaming (in the team and in the formula) the variables x0,i and y0,i by x1,i
and y1,i, respectively. Hence (8) follows.
Let us then show that
A |=X(A¯F¯0A¯F¯1/ ~x0, ~y0 ~x1, ~y1)
∧
=(~wp,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p). (10)
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Let =(~wp, y0,p) ∈ S. We need to show that the formula
~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p,
i.e., the formula
¬(~wp0 = ~w
p
1) ∨ y0,p = y1,p
is satisfied by the team in (10). Since this formula is first-order, it suffices
to show the claim for every assignment s in the team. But this is imme-
diate since, assuming s(~wp0) = s(~w
p
1), we get by the definition of F1,p that
s(y0,p) = s(y1,p). Now by combining (10) and (8) with (7), we get that
A |=X ψ as wanted.
5 The Completeness Theorem
In this section we show that our proof system allows us to derive all first-order
consequences of sentences of dependence logic.
5.1 The roadmap for the proof
Our method for finding an explicit axiomatization is based on an idea of Jon Bar-
wise [1]. Instead of dependence logic, Barwise considers the related concept of
partially ordered quantifier-prefixes. The roadmap to establishing that the axioms
are sufficiently strong goes as follows:
1. We will first show that from any sentence φ it is possible to derive a logically
equivalent sentence φ′ that is of the special form
∀ ~x0∃~y0(
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij) ∧ ψ( ~x0, ~y0)),
where ψ is quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms.
2. The sentence φ′ above can be shown to be equivalent, in countable models,
to the game expression Φ.
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∀ ~x0∃~y0(ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
∀ ~x2∃~y2(ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp1 = ~w
p
2 → y1,p = y2,p)∧
∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
2 → y0,p = y2,p)∧
...
...
...)))
3. The game expression Φ can be approximated by the first-order formulas Φn
(note that the rule 8 applied to φ′ gives exactly Φ2 ):
∀ ~x0∃~y0(ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
∀ ~x2∃~y2(ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp1 = ~w
p
2 → y1,p = y2,p)∧
∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
2 → y0,p = y2,p)∧
...
...
∀~xn−1∃~yn−1(ψ(~xn−1, ~yn−1) ∧
∧
0≤i<n−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
n−1
→ yi,p = yn−1,p)) · · · )
4. Then we show that from the sentence φ′ of Step 1 it is possible to derive the
above approximations Φn.
5. We then note that if A is a countable recursively saturated (or finite) model,
then
A |= Φ↔
∧
n
Φn.
6. Finally, we show that for any T ⊆ D and φ ∈ FO:
T |= φ ⇐⇒ T ⊢D φ
as follows: For the non-trivial direction, suppose T 6⊢D φ. Let T ∗ consist of
all the approximations of the dependence sentences in T . Now T ∗ ∪ {¬φ}
is deductively consistent in first order logic, and has therefore a countable
recursively saturated model A. But then A |= T ∪ {¬φ}, so T 6|= φ.
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5.2 From φ to φ′ in normal form
In this section we show that from any sentence φ it is possible to derive a logically
equivalent sentence φ′ of the special form
∀x1 . . .∀xm∃y1 . . . ∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , yij) ∧ θ(~x, ~y)) (11)
where θ is quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms.
Proposition 9. Let φ be a sentence of dependence logic. Then φ ⊢D φ′, where φ′
is of the form (11), and φ′ is logically equivalent to φ.
Proof. We will establish the claim in several steps. Without loss of generality, we
assume that in φ each variable is quantified only once and that, in the dependence
atoms of φ, only variables (i.e. no complex terms) occur.
• Step 1. We derive from φ an equivalent sentence in prenex normal form:
Q1x1 . . . Q
mxmθ, (12)
where Qi ∈ {∃, ∀} and θ is a quantifier-free formula.
We will prove the claim for every formula φ satisfying the assumptions
made in the beginning of the proof and the assumption (if φ has free vari-
ables) that no variable appears both free and bound in φ. It suffices to con-
sider the case φ := ψ∨θ, since the case of conjunction is analogous and the
other cases are trivial.
By the induction assumption, we have derivations ψ ⊢D ψ∗ and θ ⊢D θ∗,
where
ψ∗ = Q1x1 . . . Q
mxmψ0,
θ∗ = Qm+1xm+1 . . . Q
m+nxm+nθ0,
and ψ ≡ ψ∗ and θ ≡ θ∗. Now φ ⊢D ψ∗ ∨ θ∗, using two applications of
the rule 1. Next we prove using induction on m that, from ψ∗ ∨ θ∗, we can
derive
Q1x1 . . . Q
mxmQ
m+1xm+1 . . . Q
m+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0). (13)
Let m = 0. We prove this case again by induction; for n = 0 the claim
holds. Suppose that n = l + 1. We assume that Q1 = ∃. The case Q1 = ∀
is analogous. The following deduction now shows the claim:
16
1. ψ0 ∨Q1x1 . . . Qnxnθ0
2. Q1x1 . . . Qnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0 (rule 2)
3. Q1x1(Q2x2 . . . Qnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0) (rule 4)
4. Q1x1 . . . Qnxn(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (∃ E and D1),
where D1 is the derivation
1. Q2x2 . . . Qnxnθ0 ∨ ψ0
2. .
3. .
4. .
5. Q2x2 . . . Qnxn(θ0 ∨ ψ0) (induction assumption)
6. .
7. .
8. .
9. Q2x2 . . . Qnxn(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (D2)
10. Q1x1 . . . Qnxn(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (∃ I)
where D2 is a derivation that swaps the disjuncts. This concludes the proof
for the case m = 0.
Assume then that m = k + 1 and that the claim holds for k. Now the
following derivation shows the claim: (assume Q1 = ∃)
1. Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qmxmψ0 ∨Qm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+nθ0
2. Q1x1(Q2x2 . . . Qmxmψ0 ∨Qm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+nθ0) (rule 4)
3. Q1x1 . . . QmxmQm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (∃ E and D3)
where D3 is
1. Q2x2 . . . Qmxmψ0 ∨Qm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+nθ0
2. .
3. .
4. .
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5. Q2x2 . . . QmxmQm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (ind. assumption)
6. Q1x1 . . . QmxmQm+1xm+1 . . . Qm+nxm+n(ψ0 ∨ θ0) (∃ I)
This concludes the proof.
• Step 2. Next we show that from a quantifier-free formula θ it is possible to
derive an equivalent formula of the form:
∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~xj , zj) ∧ θ
∗), (14)
where θ∗ is a quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. Again we
prove the claim using induction on θ. If θ is first-order atomic or negated
atomic, then the claim holds. If θ is of the form =(~y, x), then rule 5 allows
us to derive
∃z(=(~y, z) ∧ z = x)
as wanted.
Assume then that θ := φ∨ψ. By the induction assumption, we have deriva-
tions φ ⊢D φ∗ and ψ ⊢D ψ∗, where
φ∗ = ∃y1 . . .∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~zj , yj) ∧ φ0),
ψ∗ = ∃yn+1 . . .∃yn+m(
∧
n+1≤j≤n+m
=(~zj , yj) ∧ ψ0)
such that φ ≡ φ∗, ψ ≡ ψ∗, and φ0 and ψ0 are quantifier-free formulas
without dependence atoms, and yi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not appear in ψ∗
and yi, for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n +m, does not appear in φ∗. Now θ ⊢D ψ∗ ∨ θ∗,
using two applications of the rule 1 and rule 6 allows us to derive
∃y1 . . .∃yn∃yn+1 . . . ∃yn+m(
∧
1≤j≤n+m
=(~zj , yj) ∧ (φ0 ∨ ψ0))
which is now equivalent to θ and has the required form. Note that in the
case θ := φ ∧ ψ only first-order inference rules for conjunction and ∃ are
needed and it is similar to the proof of Step 1.
• Step 3. The deductions in Step 1 and 2 can be combined (from φ to (12),
and then from θ to (14)) to show that
φ ⊢D Q
1x1 . . . Q
mxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~xj , zj) ∧ θ
∗). (15)
18
• Step 4. We transform the Q-quantifier prefix in (15) to ∀∗∃∗-form by using
rule 7 and pushing the new dependence atoms as new conjuncts to
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~xj , zj). (16)
Note that each swap of the quantifier ∃xj with a universal quantifier gives
rise to a new dependence atom =(~xi, xj) which we can then push to the
quantifier-free part of the formula.
We prove the claim using induction on the length m of the Q-quantifier
block in (15). For m = 1 the claim holds. Suppose that the claim holds for
k and m = k + 1. Assume Q1 = ∀. Then the following derivation can be
used:
1. ∀x1Q2x2 . . . Qmxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n =(~x
j , zj) ∧ θ
∗)
2. Q2x2 . . . Qmxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n =(~x
j , zj) ∧ θ
∗) (∀ E)
3. .
4. .
5. .
6. ∀xi1 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (ind. assumption)
7. ∀x1∀xi1 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (∀ I)
This concludes the proof in the case Q1 = ∀. Suppose then that Q1 = ∃ and
that Qi = ∀ at least for some i ≥ 2. Now the following derivation can be
used:
1. ∃x1Q2x2 . . . Qmxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n =(~x
j , zj) ∧ θ
∗)
2. ∃x1∀xi1 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (∃ E and D4)
3. ∀xi1∃x1(=(x1)∧ ∀xi2 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj)∧ θ
∗) (rule 7)
4. .
5. .
6. .
7. ∀xi1∃x1∀xi2 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′+1 =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (D5)
8. ∃x1∀xi2 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′+1 =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (∀ E)
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9. .
10. .
11. .
12. ∀xi2 · · · ∀xih∃x1∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (induction as.)
13. ∀xi1∀xi2 · · · ∀xih∃x1∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (∀ I)
where, on line 7, =(~xj , wj) is =(x1) for j = n′+1. Furthermore, above D4
refers to the following deduction
1. Q2x2 . . . Qmxm∃z1 . . .∃zn(
∧
1≤j≤n =(~x
j , zj) ∧ θ
∗)
2. .
3. .
4. .
5. ∀xi1 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (ind. assumption)
6. ∃x1∀xi1 · · · ∀xih∃~x′∃~z(
∧
1≤j≤n′ =(~x
j , wj) ∧ θ
∗) (∃ I)
and D5 is a straightforward deduction that is easy to construct. This con-
cludes the proof of the case Q1 = ∃ and also of Step 4.
Steps 1-4 show that from a sentence φ a sentence of the form
∀x1 . . .∀xm∃y1 . . . ∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , yij) ∧ θ(~x, ~y)) (17)
can be deduced. Furthermore, φ and the sentence in (17) are logically equivalent
since logical equivalence is preserved in each of the Steps 1-4.
5.3 Derivation of the approximations Φn
In the previous section we showed that from any sentence of dependence logic a
logically equivalent sentence of the form
∀ ~x0∃~y0(
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij) ∧ ψ( ~x0, ~y0)), (18)
can be derived, where ψ is quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. We
will next show that the approximations Φn of the game expression Φ (discussed
in Section 5.1) correponding to sentence (18), can be deduced from it.
The formulas Φ and Φn are defined as follows.
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Definition 10. Let φ be the formula (18), where ~x0 = (x0,1, . . . , x0,m) and ~y0 =
(y0,1, . . . , y0,n), and the variables in ~wij are contained in the set
{x0,1, . . . , x0,m, y0,1, . . . , y0,ij−1}.
Furthermore, let S be the set containing the conjuncts of
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij),
and the dependence atom = (x0,1, . . . , x0,m, y0,p) for each of the variables y0,p
(1 ≤ p ≤ n) such that y0,p /∈ {y0,i1, . . . , y0,ik}. Define ~xl = (xl,1, . . . , xl,m),
~yl = (yl,1, . . . , yl,n) and ~wpl analogously.
• The infinitary formula Φ is now defined as:
∀ ~x0∃~y0(ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
∀ ~x2∃~y2(ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp1 = ~w
p
2 → y1,p = y2,p)∧
∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
2 → y0,p = y2,p)∧
...
...
...)))
(19)
• The nth approximation Φn of φ is defined as:
∀ ~x0∃~y0(ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
∀ ~x2∃~y2(ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp1 = ~w
p
2 → y1,p = y2,p)∧
∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
2 → y0,p = y2,p)∧
...
...
∀~xn−1∃~yn−1(ψ(~xn−1, ~yn−1) ∧
∧
0≤i<n−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
n−1
→ yi,p = yn−1,p)) · · · )
We will next show that the approximations Φn can be deduced from φ.
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Proposition 11. Let φ and Φn be as in Definition 10. Then
φ ⊢D Φ
n
for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. We will prove a slightly stronger claim: φ ⊢D Ωn, where Ωn is defined
otherwise as Φn, except that, on the last line, we also have the conjunct
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~w
ij
n−1, yn−1,ij)
(see (18)), with the variables x0,l and y0,l replaced by xn−1,l and yn−1,l, respec-
tively.
Let us first note that clearly
Ωn ⊢D Φ
n,
since this amounts only to showing that the new conjunct can be eliminated from
the formula. Hence to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that
φ ⊢D Ω
n
for all n ≥ 1. We will prove the claim using induction on n. The claim holds for
n = 1, since Ω1 = φ. Suppose that n = h + 1. By the induction assumption,
φ ⊢D Ω
h
. Let us recall that Ωh is the sentence
∀ ~x0∃~y0(ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
∀ ~x1∃~y1(ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
∀ ~x2∃~y2(ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp1 = ~w
p
2 → y1,p = y2,p)∧
∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
2 → y0,p = y2,p)∧
...
...
∀~xh−1∃~yh−1(ψ(~xh−1, ~yh−1) ∧
∧
1≤j≤k =(~w
ij
h−1, yh−1,ij)∧∧
0≤i<h−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
h−1 → yi,p = yh−1,p)) · · · )
The claim φ ⊢D Ωh+1 is now proved as follows:
1. We first eliminate the quantifiers and conjuncts of Ωh to show that, from φ,
the following subformula of Ωh can be deduced:
∀~xh−1∃~yh−1(ψ(~xh−1, ~yh−1) ∧
∧
1≤j≤k =(~w
ij
h−1, yh−1,ij)∧∧
0≤i<h−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
h−1 → yi,p = yh−1,p))
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2. Then rule 8 essentially allows us to deduce
∀~xh−1∃~yh−1(ψ(~xh−1, ~yh−1) ∧
∧
0≤i<h−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
h−1
→ yi,p = yh−1,p)∧
∀~xh∃~yh(ψ(~xh, ~yh) ∧
∧
1≤j≤k =(~w
ij
h , yh,ij)∧∧
0≤i<h
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
h → yi,p = yh,p)))
3. and finally it suffices to ”reverse” the derivation in Step 1 to show that φ ⊢D
Ωh+1.
We will now show the deduction of the formula in Step 2 assuming the formula
in Step 1. To simply notation, we use the following shorthands:
• Pl := ψ(~xl, ~yl),
• Dl :=
∧
1≤j≤k =(~w
ij
l , yl,ij),
• Cl :=
∧
0≤i<l
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
l → yi,p = yl,p)
• C−l :=
∧
0≤i<l−1
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
l → yi,p = yl,p)
• C+l :=
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpl−1 = ~w
p
l → yl−1,p = yl,p)
It is important to note that C−l ∧ C
+
l = Cl. The following deduction now shows
the claim:
1. ∀~xh−1∃~yh−1(Ph−1 ∧Dh−1 ∧ Ch−1)
2. .
3. .
4. .
5. ∀~xh−1∃~yh−1(Dh−1 ∧ (Ph−1 ∧Dh−1 ∧ Ch−1)) (D1)
6. ∀~xh−1∃~yh−1((Ph−1∧Dh−1∧Ch−1)∧∀~xh∃~yh((Ph∧Dh∧C−h )∧C+l ) (Rule
8)
7. .
8. .
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9. .
10. ∀~xh−1∃~yh−1((Ph−1 ∧ Ch−1) ∧ ∀~xh∃~yh(Ph ∧Dh ∧ Ch)) (D2)
In the above derivation, the derivation D1 just creates one extra copy of Dh−1,
and D2 deletes Dh−1 from the formula and groups together C−h and C+h . The
deductions D1 and D2 can be easily constructed.
This completes the proof Proposition 11.
5.4 Back from approximations
In this section we prove the main result of the paper.
The use of game expressions to analyze existential second order sentences is
originally due to Lars Svenonius [7]. Subsequently it was developed by Robert
Vaught [9].
Basic fact about the game expressions is:
Proposition 12. Let φ and Φ be as in Section 5.1. Then φ |= Φ. In countable
models Φ |= φ.
Proof. Suppose φ is as in (18) and A |= φ. Suppose furthermore Φ as in (19). We
show A |= Φ. By definition, the truth of Φ in A means the existence of a winning
strategy of player II in the following game G(A,Φ):
I ~a0 ~a1 . . .
II ~b0 ~b1 . . .
where ~ai, ~bi are chosen form A, and player II wins if the assignment s(~xi) = ~ai,
s(~yi) = ~bi satisfies for all n:
A |=s ψ( ~xn, ~yn) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
n → yi,p = yn,p).
We can get a winning strategy for player II as follows. Since A |= φ, there are
functions fi(x1, ..., xm), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that if X is the set of all assignments s
with s(yi) = fi(s(x1), ..., s(xm)), then
A |=X
∧
1≤j≤k
=(~wij , y0,ij) ∧ θ(~x, ~y). (20)
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The strategy of player II in G(A,Φ) is to play
~bi = (f1(~ai), . . . , fn(~ai)).
This guarantees that if s(~xi) = ~ai, s(~yi) = ~bi, then clearly A |=s ψ( ~xn, ~yn), but we
have to also show that A |=s
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
n → yi,p = yn,p). This follows
immediately from (20).
Suppose then A is a countable model of Φ. We show A |= φ. Let ~an =
(a1n, ..., a
m
n ), n < ω, list all m-sequences of elements of A. We play the game
G(A,Φ) letting player I play the sequence ~an as his n’th move. Let ~bn be the
response of II , according to her winning strategy, to ~an. Let fi be the function
~an 7→ b
i
n. It is a direct consequence of the winning condition of player II that if X
is the set of assignments s with s(yi) = fi(s(x1), ..., s(xm)), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then (20)
holds.
Definition 13. A model A is recursively saturated if it satisfies
∀~x((
∧
n
∃y
∧
m≤n
φm(~x, y))→ ∃y
∧
n
φn(~x, y)),
whenever {φn(~x, y) : n ∈ N} is recursive.
There are many recursively saturated models:
Proposition 14 ([2]). For every infinite A there is a recursively saturated count-
able A′ such that A ≡ A′.
Over a recursively saturated model, the game expression can be replaced by a
conjunction of its approximations:
Proposition 15. If A is recursively saturated (or finite), then
A |= Φ↔
∧
n
Φn.
Proof. Suppose first A |= Φ. Thus ∃ has a winning strategy τ in the game
G(A,Φ). Then A |= Φn for each n, since the ∃-player can simply follow the
strategy τ in the game G(A,Φn) and win. For the converse, suppose A |= Φn for
each n. Let Φn+1m ( ~x0, ~y0, ..., ~xn−1, ~yn−1) be the first-order formula:
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ψ( ~x0, ~y0)∧
ψ( ~x1, ~y1) ∧
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wp0 = ~w
p
1 → y0,p = y1,p)∧
ψ( ~x2, ~y2) ∧
∧
i∈{0,1}
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
2 → yi,p = y2,p)∧
· · ·
· · ·
∀~xn−1∃~yn−1(
ψ(~xn−1, ~yn−1) ∧
∧n−1
i=0
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
n−1 → yi,p = yn−1,p)))∧
· · ·
· · ·
∀~xm∃~ym(
ψ(~xm, ~ym) ∧
∧m−1
i=0
∧
=(~wp
0
,y0,p)∈S
(~wpi = ~w
p
m → yi,p = ym,p)) . . .)
The strategy of ∃ in the game G(A,Φ) is the following:
(∗) If the game position is (~a0, ~b0, ...,~an−1,~bn−1) then for each m we have
A |= Φnm(~a0, ~b0, ...,~an−1,~bn−1).
It is easy to check, using the recursive saturation, that ∃ can play according to this
strategy and that she wins this way.
Corollary 16. If A is a countable recursively saturated (or finite) model, then
A |= φ↔
∧
n
Φ0n.
Proof. By Propositions 12 and 15.
Lemma 17 (Transitivity of deduction). Suppose φ1, ..., φn,ψ1, ..., ψm and θ are
sentences of dependence logic. If {φ1, ..., φn} ⊢D ψi for i = 1, ..., m, and
{ψ1, ..., ψm} ⊢D θ, then {φ1, ..., φn} ⊢D θ.
Proof. The deduction of θ from {φ1, ..., φn} is obtained from the dedction of θ
from {ψ1, ..., ψm} by replacing each application of the assumption ψi by the de-
duction of ψi from {φ1, ..., φn}.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this article.
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Theorem 18. Let T be a set of sentences of dependence logic and φ ∈ FO. Then
the following are equivalent:
(I) T |= φ
(II) T ⊢D φ
Proof. Suppose first (I) but T 6⊢D φ. Let T ∗ consist of all the approximations
of the dependence sentences in T . Since the approximations are provable from
the original sentences, Lemma 17 gives T ∗ 6⊢D φ. Note that T ∗ ∪ {¬φ} is a first
order theory. Clearly, T ∗ ∪ {¬φ} is deductively consistent in first order logic,
since we have all the first order inference rules as part of our deduction system.
Let A be a countable recursively saturated model of this theory. By Lemma 15,
A |= T ∪ {¬φ}, contradicting (I). We have proved (II). (II) implies (I) by the
Soundness Theorem.
6 Examples and open questions
In this section we present some examples and open problems.
Example 19. This example is an application of the dependence distribution rule
in a context where continuity of functions is being discussed.
1. Given ǫ, x, y and f .
2. If ǫ > 0, then there is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ such that if |x − y| < δ,
then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
3. Therefore, there is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ such that if ǫ > 0 and |x−y| <
δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
Example 20. This is an example of an application of the dependence elimination
rule, again in a context where continuity of functions is being contemplated.
1. Assume that for every x and every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ
such that for all y, if |x− y| < δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
2. Therefore, for every x and every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 such that for all y, if
|x−y| < δ, then |f(x)−f(y)| < ǫ, and moreover, for another x′ and ǫ′ > 0
there is δ′ > 0 such that for all y′, if |x′− y′| < δ′, then |f(x′)− f(y′)| < ǫ,
and if ǫ = ǫ′, then δ = δ′.
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Example 21. This is a different type of example of the use of the dependence
elimination rule. Let φ be the following sentence:
φ : ∀x∃y∃z(=(y, z) ∧ (x = z ∧ y 6= c)),
where c is a constant symbol. It is straightforward to verify that A |= φ iff A is
infinite. The idea is that the dependence atom=(y, z) forces the interpretation of y
to encode an injective function fromA toA that is not surjective (since y 6= c must
also hold). On the other hand, for the approximations Φn, it holds that A |= Φn
iff |A| ≥ n + 1: for Φ1
Φ1 := ∀x0∃y0∃z0(x0 = z0 ∧ y0 6= c)
this is immediate, and in general, the claim can be proved using induction on n.
We end this section with some open questions.
1. Our complete axiomatization, as it is, applies only to sentences. Is the same
axiomatization complete also with respect to formulas?
2. Our natural deduction makes perfect sense also as a way to derive non first
order sentences of dependence logic. What is the modified concept (or con-
cepts) of a structure relative to which this is complete?
3. Are dependence distribution and dependence delineation really necessary?
Do we lose completeness if one or both of them are dropped? Is there other
redundancy in the rules?
4. Do similar axiom systems yield Completeness Theorems in other depen-
dence logics, such as modal dependence logic, or dependence logic with
intuitionistic implication?
5. Is there a similar deductive system for first order consequences of sentences
of independence logic introduced in [5]? In principle this should be possi-
ble. One immediate complication that arises is that independence logic does
not satisfy downward closure (the analogue of Proposition 5), and hence,
e.g., the rule ∀ E is not sound for independence logic. For example, the
formula ∀x∀y(x⊥y), is universally true but x⊥y certainly is not.
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